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Federal Tax Reform: 
State and Local Perspective
Ronald C. Fisher 
Michigan State University
Introduction*
As you know, the nation is now embroiled in a debate 
concerning the merits of major structural reform of the federal 
income tax system involving both the broadening of the tax 
base by elimination of exclusions, exemptions, and deduc 
tions, and the reduction of both the number and progressivity 
of rate brackets. A central element of nearly all such tax 
reform plans is curtailment or elimination of the itemized 
deduction for state and local taxes now available to individual 
taxpayers. Therefore, I will discuss first how federal tax 
reform might directly affect state and local governments, and 
second, how those subnational governments might respond to 
the federal tax changes. The potential pattern of winners and 
losers among the states will be discussed, and how state and 
local governments might be able to offset some of the effects 
of curtailment of federal deductibility and other reform 
changes by altering their own fiscal structure and behavior will 
be considered.
Before considering the tax reform proposals specifically, it 
may be useful to note the opinion of several experts regarding 
tax reform. In introducing his tax reform proposal to the 
nation in May of 1985, President Reagan concluded that "The 
tax system has come to be unAmerican." In contrast, Senator 
Russell Long, at one time chairman of the Senate Finance
"These comments were first offered as a lecture in January 1986. A postscript has been added 
to incorporate details of the tax bill adopted by Congress in September 1986.
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Committee (the committee which considers tax policy in the 
U.S. Senate) noted in 1967 that
Many businessmen contribute to legislators who 
have fought against taxes that would have been 
burdensome to their businesses, whether the tax 
increase was proposed as a so-called reform, a 
loophole closer, or just an effort to balance the 
federal budget.
(Congregational Record, April 4, 1967.)
Finally, at an unknown date and regarding an unknown topic, 
Yogi Berra is reported to have said: "It's deja vu all over 
again."
Obviously, these views are very different. The President, on 
the one hand, argues that the tax system, with its myriad 
exclusions, deductions, and credits, is unAmerican, and per 
haps that it is unpatriotic to support the current tax structure 
and oppose major reform. In response, the President offered 
what he called "America's tax plan." But Senator Long, with 
long tax experience in the Congress, had a very different 
notion. He argued that businessmen will contribute to politi 
cal officials in an attempt to protect their own economic 
interest. Rather than being unAmerican, Senator Long sug 
gests that this behavior is typical of and fully expected in 
American politics. I think we can expand his notion of 
businessmen to almost everyone. Certainly we have recently 
observed that state and local government officials and their 
representatives can be equally as active, and perhaps equally 
as effective, as businessmen in trying to influence the Congress 
when it comes to tax reform. And, as Mr. Berra noted, it is 
deja vu all over again! The tax code which the President 
characterized as unAmerican developed over many years, not 
instantly. In addition, most of the ideas included in the current 
tax reform proposals have been proposed and debated in the
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past, at least over the last 25 years. And what Senator Long 
observed in 1967 is equally true today.
What, then, is different about the current tax reform 
debate? Perhaps it is that in the past, reform proposals have 
largely come from experts economists, lawyers, and oth 
ers outside of government, while recently those same pro 
posals have been offered first by several Senators and Repre 
sentatives, then by the U.S. Treasury, and, most recently, by 
the President.
Review of Recent Proposals
Although a number of different tax reform plans were 
introduced in Congress in the past three years, let us concen 
trate here on the developments beginning with the release, in 
November 1984, of a proposal developed by the U.S. Depart 
ment of the Treasury at the President's request. That propos 
al, which came to be called Treasury I, would have increased 
the personal exemption and standard deduction, generally 
eliminated the itemized deductions (except in a very few 
cases), and indexed the tax structure for inflation, not only 
including indexation of tax rates, the personal exemption and 
the standard deduction, but also indexation in calculation of 
depreciation as well as interest and other capital income. 
Fringe benefits, such as employer-provided health insurance, 
would have been added to the tax base in a substantial way. 
Tax rates would have been confined to brackets of 15 percent, 
25 percent, and 35 percent. Business deductions would have 
been reduced or eliminated, the investment tax credit repealed, 
and the corporate tax rate set at 33 percent. The tax system 
would certainly have been simpler in what truly would have 
been significant reform.
In May of 1985, the President moved away from Treasury I, 
introducing his own tax reform plan, entitled "The President's
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Tax Proposals to the Congress for Fairness, Growth, and 
Simplicity," which came to be called Treasury II and referred 
to here as the President's Plan. This second plan encompassed 
major tax reform, but was substantially different from the 
original proposal in several important areas. Some itemized 
deductions, for example for charitable contributions, found 
their way back into the tax structure. The broad taxation of 
fringe benefits which had been proposed in Treasury I was 
effectively eliminated in Treasury II. The remaining proposed 
taxation of health insurance, for example, was effectively 
insignificant. A minimum tax was created to force individuals 
or firms which would not have liabilities under the general 
rules to pay some amount of tax. The second plan followed 
the first in raising personal exemptions and the standard 
deduction and using three rate classes (15 percent, 25 percent, 
35 percent).
With the President's proposal in hand, the Congress went to 
work. The House considered the issue throughout the summer 
and into the fall. Negotiations were alternately going forward 
at full speed and the next day breaking down. Finally, the 
House Ways and Means Committee reported out a bill, under 
the direction of chairman Rostenkowski, and in December the 
House passed a tax reform bill. This plan was substantially 
different from the proposal which the President had offered in 
May, and even more substantially different than the original 
Treasury proposal of the previous November.
First of all, the itemized deduction for state and local taxes 
was still allowed under the House bill; it would not have been 
under either of the two Reagan/Treasury proposals. A major 
issue of confrontation, therefore, was how to treat state and 
local taxes. There also was substantial difference in the 
treatment of fringe benefits. While the Reagan proposal 
would tax fringes less than the original Treasury proposal, the
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House proposal does so even less, so much so that, for all 
practical purposes, fringe benefits are not taxed in the House 
bill at all. The House proposal added a fourth rate bracket at 
38 percent, which would apply to joint returns with adjusted 
gross income at or about $100,000 a year. The concept of the 
minimum tax which found its way into President Reagan's 
proposal was also retained in the House proposal.
In some ways, it is as interesting to consider what these 
various tax reform proposals do not do. For example, social 
security income will not be taxed more than it is currently. 
Apparently, social security income is just politically untouch 
able. The credit for business research and development activ 
ities is maintained. In a national sense, this credit is not very 
substantial, but it turns out to be very important to firms in 
Michigan. While the original Treasury proposal adopted more 
or less complete indexation of the tax code for inflation 
applying to all of the nominal dollar amounts in the tax code 
as well as the definition of capital income, the political process 
has reduced the degree of indexation substantially. Interest 
ingly, despite substantial popular discussion over the last three 
or four years about flat taxes, none of the proposals is truly a 
flat tax, that is, with one rate. Some progressivity in the rate 
structure is maintained.
During the tax reform debate, state and local government 
officials and their representative interest groups have generally 
been vocal critics of all the tax reform proposals. They have 
criticized the notion of ending the deduction for state and 
local government taxes. They have been vocal critics of 
changing the definition of the kinds of activities for which 
state and local governments can sell bonds, the interest from 
which is not taxed as income in the federal code. In general, 
states are concerned about the interstate distribution of tax 
savings from reform and about how the loss of deductibility
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might affect the ability of state and local governments to raise 
taxes in the future or continue to provide financing for current 
services. Each of those concerns is now considered.
First Concern: Interstate Distribution of Tax Savings
Early consideration of the likely effects of tax reform for 
states focused on the implication for the interstate distribution 
of federal tax reductions (or interstate increases) caused by 
reform. Federal tax reform will not be geographically neutral. 
The residents of some states will benefit more than the 
residents of others, if for no other reason than federal tax 
reform treats different income taxpayers differently, and states 
differ in their income distributions. The U.S. Department of 
the Treasury estimated that the President's proposal would 
have reduced personal income taxes by 7 percent in aggregate, 
with nearly 60 percent of taxpayers receiving some reductions. 
Thus, the likely concern is the relative amount of tax reduction 
by state, i.e., which states have less than a 7 percent aggregate 
reduction and which more. To date, the Treasury Department 
has not released or published any state-by-state analysis of the 
tax reform plan's effect.
One often gets the impression from state and local govern 
ment officials that the interstate distribution of personal tax 
reduction caused by tax reform arises almost entirely from 
changing the deduction for state and local taxes. They suggest, 
obviously, that states with both a relatively large fraction of 
taxpayers who itemize deductions and relatively large 
amounts of deductible taxes stand to "lose" most from 
eliminating the deduction. But many, if not all, of the tax 
features affected by the reform plans have uneven effects on 
the distribution of taxes among the states. Similarly, those tax 
features not curtailed (or perhaps even enhanced) by the plan 
also are significant for any interstate variation in tax burdens.
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These features, too, are not expected to be geographically 
neutral. This fact has been noted by Business Week:
The nondeductibility of state and local taxes is but 
one factor, and probably not the most important 
one, determining states' futures.... If the tax plan is 
enacted in its present form there will be substantial 
variations in its regional impact. But which states 
and regions emerge as the biggest gainers and losers 
may be surprising. (June 17, 1985.)
For example, long-term nonresidential capital gain income 
varies greatly by state. The President's tax reform proposal 
(Treasury II) would have decreased the taxation of capital 
gains, while the House bill would have raised capital gains 
taxes slightly. In 1981, half of all taxable capital gains income 
accrued to residents of just six states: California, Colorado, 
Florida, Illinois, New York, and Texas. That fact understates 
the concentration, because nearly 35 percent of total capital 
gains income that year went to residents of only three states: 
California (16 percent), Texas (10 percent), New York (9 
percent). If the deduction for state-local taxes were continued 
and the revenue loss made up by increasing the tax on capital 
gains, it is not clear that a state such as New York, whose 
officials have been prominent in opposing the curtailment of 
the state-local tax deduction, would be better off. That is, the 
distribution of any tax change needs to be compared to the 
distributional effects of the substitute tax provision.
As a second example, Clark and Neubig (1984) report the 
volume of new, private purpose tax exempt bonds issued in 
1983 by state. The President's tax reform plan would eliminate 
the interest exemption for many of these state-local bonds. 
But the list of the 10 largest state users of this exemption in 
1983 includes Texas (2), Florida (3), Arizona (8), and Virginia
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(9), none of which are states usually identified as likely losers 
from ending the state-local tax deduction.
Finally, while all of the tax reform proposals would end the 
double personal exemption for senior citizens, both the Pres 
ident's and the House plans would expand the credit for low 
income taxpayers, including low income elderly taxpayers. 
Most of the analyses which I have seen suggest that low 
income elderly taxpayers would be substantially better off 
under either tax reform plan, while higher income elderly 
taxpayers would have smaller than average tax reductions. 
But of all elderly taxpayers with 1981 income less than 
$10,000, nearly 40 percent lived in just six states: California, 
Florida, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas. Again, 
several states often classified as "losers" from elimination of 
the deduction for state and local taxes apparently stand to 
"gain" from this change in the treatment of elderly taxpayers.
In other words, it is not easy to determine which states' 
residents will be winners and which will be losers, on average, 
from the distribution of federal tax changes. As the tax reform 
proposals are adjusted, maintaining revenue neutrality, there 
may certainly be some surprises about the geographic effects 
of those changes. And to the extent that the tax reform plan 
would tax currently exempt or excluded activities, state-by- 
state data may not be available (certainly from tax sources) to 
estimate the effects.
It may be possible to estimate the interstate distribution of 
personal tax changes due to reform indirectly, however, if one 
is willing to assume that all of the changes can be reflected by 
income. The U.S. Treasury Department estimated, for the 
President's tax plan, the expected percentage reductions in 
personal taxes by income class. That information can be 
combined with income distribution data for each state to 
estimate the aggregate percentage personal tax reductions for
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residents of each state. 1 (See Table 1). Those calculations were 
done by an undergraduate student at Michigan State, Lori 
Brown, and me, using 1981 data. Essentially, we considered 
what the effect of the President's tax proposal would have 
been in 1981.
Table 1 
Interstate Distribution of Tax Features
Federal Tax Change Due to Reform 
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Interstate Distribution of Tax Features—Cont.
Federal Tax Change Due to Reform 
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Source: L. Brown (1986).
We found that adoption of only the personal tax changes in 
the President's tax plan would have increased disposable
77
personal income an average of 1.21 percent, with a range from 
1.03 percent in South Dakota to 1.51 percent in Alaska. 
Michigan residents, by the way, would have had a 1.14 
percent increase in disposable personal income. Measured 
instead in terms of percentage tax decreases, the results show 
an average 9 percent decrease in personal taxes, with a range 
of 8.4 percent in Louisiana to 10.8 percent in Maine. Again, 
Michigan is slightly below the average at 8.5 percent. Al 
though this is an admittedly rough approximation, the pattern 
of results is similar to those derived by others who examine the 
effects of specific details of the tax plan. The results suggest 
that while federal tax reform will not be neutral between 
residents of different states, the differences between states are 
not likely to be very substantial, certainly not to the degree 
which has been suggested.
There is one important qualification to all of this. The 
notion of reduced taxes for individuals as a result of federal 
tax reform is an illusion. Because the proposed tax plans are 
designed to raise the same amount of revenue as the current 
structure would have raised, at least by estimation, there will 
be no reduction of total taxes. In essence, the intent is for 
increased corporate tax collections to substitute for reduced 
personal tax collections, with total taxes remaining the same. 
The tax systems proposed in the various plans are designed to 
withdraw approximately the same amount of resources from 
the private economy as the current structure. The myth of 
individual tax reduction is created by separating personal and 
corporate tax payments, and then ignoring the corporate 
payments. For this to make any sense requires that corpora 
tions operate as "black holes," where taxes enter, never to 
reappear. This is nonsense. The tax collected from corpora 
tions may cause higher prices or lower wages or lower returns 
on investment, all of which affect individuals. What tax reform
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will do is alter the distribution of the tax burden among 
individuals.
Second Concern: Effect on Subnational 
Government Programs
The second issue about federal tax reform which concerns 
state and local government officials is whether curtailment of 
the deduction for state and local taxes will affect the ability of 
the states to finance services. The marginal price of state and 
local government services to taxpayers who itemize federal tax 
deductions is increased if state and local taxes can no longer 
be deducted. This increase in tax prices could, in some cases, 
actually bring about reductions from current state or local 
spending levels or, more likely, would slow the growth of 
state-local spending by making it harder to further increase 
state or local tax rates. For instance, the Wall Street Journal 
reported the Alaska revenue commissioner's fear that "resi 
dents would resist the need for new or higher revenue 
collections if the U.S. stops allowing taxpayers to deduct their 
local tax payments," (June 11,1985, p. 58). Because the loss of 
deductibility would particularly raise tax burdens for higher 
income taxpayers, there is concern that some might want to 
leave high tax states or cities. Thus, New York Governor 
Mario Cuomo is quoted as saying "They're pitting state 
against state. A lot of my people will leave New York so that 
they can live where their taxes are lower" (Business Week, 
June 17, 1985).
First of all, it is important to emphasize that even if 
deductibility is retained in a federal tax reform plan, the value 
of that deduction would be reduced, and thus the subsidy to 
state and local governments would also be reduced. The value 
of the state-local tax deduction will be substantially eroded by 
the other features of reform. A larger standard deduction,
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cutbacks in other allowed itemized deductions, and the greater 
personal exemption for nonitemizers which is part of the 
House plan, would all reduce the number of itemizers, so that 
fewer taxpayers would be deducting state-local taxes. Even for 
those taxpayers who would still itemize (and thus deduct 
state-local taxes) the value of the deduction will be smaller 
because tax rates will be lower. Some estimates suggest that as 
much as half of the current value of deductibility would be lost 
even if deductibility remains in the tax code. Therefore, part of 
the loss of the state-local government subsidy occurs generally 
as the result of tax reform (even if that specific deduction is 
retained) and part because of the curtailment of the deduction.
Will the loss of deductibility or the reduced value of 
deductibility matter? Evidence is sparse, but seems to show 
that deductibility has induced states and localities to increase 
spending slightly and to favor certain revenue sources (deduct 
ible taxes, for example) over others. A reduction of deduci 
bility's value, then, might reduce state-local taxes slightly (or 
more correctly, slow their growth) and induce states to alter 
their tax structures. I expect that local governments, in many 
cases, will be affected less by the decreased value of deduct 
ibility than state governments because of state tax incentives. 
Local taxes (mostly property taxes) are deductible against 
state income taxes in 33 states, while 30 states have state 
credits for local property taxes (including Michigan). A 
number obviously have both. These features will become more 
important and will mitigate the effect on property taxpayers of 
a reduction in or loss of federal deductibility.
The following example, based on the Michigan property tax 
credit, illustrates that point. Consider a family of four with a 
$40,000 income, which pays $2,400 in property taxes and has 
a total of $5,000 in federal itemized deductions. Such a family 
receives a Michigan property tax credit of $600 and is in the 25
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percent federal income tax rate bracket. As a result, an 
increase in property taxes of $1 would actually cost this family 
only $.30, after the federal deduction and the state credit. If 
the federal income tax is changed so that the personal 
exemption rises (to $2,000) and tax rates are reduced (this 
family is now in the 15 percent federal rate class), then the 
family's cost of a $1 property tax increase rises to $.40 if no 
deduction for state and local taxes is allowed and to $.34 if the 
deduction is retained.
First, this family's local tax cost rises due to federal tax 
reform even if deductibility is retained. Second, the increases 
in local tax cost due to federal tax reform (with or without 
deductibility) are small. The loss of federal deductibility 
increases this family's marginal property tax cost from $.30 to 
$.40, not from $.75 to $1.00, which would occur without the 
state credit. Without deductibility, the state credit becomes 
more important and offsets a larger amount of local taxes.
Exhibit 1
Marginal Property Tax Cost in Michigan: 
Deduction/Homestead Credit Illustration
Fiscal Details $40,000 Income; 4 Exemptions
$80,000 House; 60 Mill Tax Rate 
$5,000 Itemized Deductions
Homestead Credit = 60% ($2,400-$ 1,400) =
600 
Marginal Property Tax Cost = .4(1-7),
where t = federal marginal tax rate of
itemizer
Current Structure Homestead Credit = $600
Federal Taxable Income = $31,000 
Federal Marginal Tax Rate = 25% 
Marginal Property Tax Cost = $.30
Federal Reform-No Deduction: Homestead Credit = $600
Federal Taxable Income = $28,000 
Federal Marginal Tax Rate = 15% 
Marginal Property Tax Cost = $.40
Federal Reform-With Deduction: Homestead Credit = $600
Federal Taxable Income = $27,000 
Federal Marginal Tax Rate = 15% 
Marginal Property Tax Cost = $.34
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Summary: Marginal Property Tax Cost
___________________Tax Structure_____
Current, Reform, 
Deducibility Current Reform No Credit No Credit
Yes 130 134 $ .75 $ .85 
No $.40 $.40 $1.00 $1.00
One should also keep in mind that it is possible that the 
demand for state-local government services would rise be 
cause of other effects of federal tax reform. One such factor 
may be the change in the deduction (and thus subsidy) for 
other goods and services which may be strong substitutes for 
or complements to current subnational government services. 
Two potential cases may be charitable activities, the subsidy 
for which would be reduced because of lower marginal tax 
rates and the end of the charitable deduction for nonitemizers, 
and housing, which would be affected by lower rates and the 
possible loss of the deductions for property taxes and interest 
on second homes. These changes are expected to increase the 
marginal costs of both charitable contributions and housing 
consumption. One might expect that the activities of many 
charitable organizations are substitutes for state and local 
government services and expenditures, and it is known that 
charitable contributions are substantially more price-sensitive 
than is the demand for state-local goods. Thus one expects a 
relatively large decline in individual charitable contributions 
due to federal tax reform, which could increase the demand 
for government spending on similar services. The effect of 
changes in housing demand are more problematic, partly 
because the base for local property taxes as well as demand for 
services could be affected.
Finally, because the Treasury Department estimates that 
personal income taxes would decrease by 7 percent overall 
under the President's plan, with more than 58 percent of 
individual taxpayers enjoying some decrease, disposable per-
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sonal income would increase for some taxpayers. Such an 
income gain implies an increase in the demand for subnational 
government spending. Nonitemizers are particularly expected 
to enjoy net tax decreases (that is, income increases) as a result 
of the reform plan. So while the desired level of state-local 
spending might fall for current itemizers because of the 
increased price, desired state-local spending by nonitemizers 
would increase. And nationally, only about 35 percent of 
taxpayers have itemized deductions in recent years.
In a slightly different version of this second concern, Henry 
Thomassen, an adviser to the Governor of Georgia, has 
argued that the biggest problem for states from the loss of 
deductibility is the redistribution of tax burden among dif 
ferent income taxpayers. Mr. Thomassen writes:
Deductibility provides tax expenditures to individu 
als rather than governments. Because of progressive 
income tax systems, the benefits received then differ 
greatly among individuals ... if deductibility were 
suddenly ended, losses would be imposed upon 
taxpayers in inequitable fashion. Today's itemizers 
would carry an enlarged share of both the Federal 
and the State and local taxes. (National Tax Journal, 
September 1985.)
In response to this problem, states can, and I believe will, 
change their own tax structures. States and localities currently 
make use of some revenue sources, such as gasoline taxes, 
license fees, and user charges, which are not deductible. Even 
among deductible taxes there is wide variation in reliance and 
structure across states. One avenue of response for states to 
curtailment of the deduction, then, is change in their revenue 
structure. But if states or localities do change their revenue 
mix as a result of federal tax reform, this would also change 
the equity and efficiency effects of the reform plan. States
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would want to reduce taxes on those residents who lose 
because of curtailment of federal deductibility. Some options 
are less progressive personal income tax rate structures and 
more reliance on business taxes. The result is to work against 
the incentives for those taxpayers to move or for those 
taxpayers to demand less state spending. The burden of the 
loss of deductibility gets spread over all taxpayers and thus the 
magnitude of effects is reduced. I firmly believe that if federal 
tax reform reduces the value of the state and local tax 
deduction uniformly, the states will use fees and direct busi 
ness taxes more heavily than in the past and will adopt less 
progressive personal tax structures. If the state and local tax 
deduction is reduced for only some state and local taxes (such 
as the elimination of the deduction for sales taxes which was 
finally adopted), then states will move away from use of the 
tax which is no longer deductible.
Conclusions
Most economists believe that federal tax reform would be 
more efficient and more attractive if the tax base is broadened 
even more than is currently proposed, and thus tax rates 
lowered more than currently proposed. Such a plan could be 
fashioned by combining some features of the President's plan 
(such as reducing deductions for state and local taxes, con 
sumer interest payments, and some business expenses and 
ending exemptions for some income from tax exempt bonds 
and transfer payments) with some features of the House bill 
(such as increased taxation of capital gains income, an 
effective minimum tax, and a two-tiered personal exemption).
This evening I have considered some of the ways federal tax 
reform might affect state and local governments. It appears 
that tax reform will not be neutral among the states, although 
the differences in changes in tax liabilities among states will
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likely be small. The loss of federal deductibility of state and 
local taxes and tax reform in general will increase the marginal 
cost of state and local tax increases. The result will likely be a 
small decrease in state and local taxes, but much of that effect 
may be offset by changes in state and local governments' tax 
structure, particularly by moving away from taxes which are 
no longer deductible or by adopting less progressive state- 
local tax systems.
In terms of the states' position about tax reform, my point 
of view is that the potential effects on the states have generally 
been overblown. State and local government concerns about 
federal tax reform have also been somewhat misdirected, in 
focusing almost exclusively on the loss of deductibility. Other 
aspects of the tax reform plan, particularly the decreased 
amount of itemizing and the lower rates, will have almost as 
big an effect for state and local governments as the loss of 
deductibility per se.
Regardless of these effects, no one sector of the economy 
should dictate the nature or possibility of tax reform. I think 
it is necessary to move away from thinking about how tax 
reform will affect Joe, how it will affect Michigan, how it will 
affect the computer industry, or how it will affect state and 
local governments. We have to think of what tax reform can 
do for our economy in an overall sense. It is only in that way 
that the diffused positive effects of tax reform can outweigh 
the apparent short-term costs to individual sectors.
The potential promise of tax reform is that taxes become 
less important in economic decision making, less important at 
the margin, as economists like to say. That is accomplished 
largely through the lower tax rates. To maintain revenue 
neutrality, the base in broadened, which improves fairness and 
efficiency as well. Perhaps the clearest "winners" from tax 
reform will be low income workers who will be removed from
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the tax rolls. And the clearest "losers" are likely to be high 
income individuals with substantial capital investments, par 
ticularly in tax shelters. That support for such a change arose 
across the political spectrum is remarkable in itself.
Postscript: The Tax Reform Act of 1986 is Adopted
In June 1986, the Senate approved a new tax reform 
proposal developed by the Senate Finance Committee under 
the direction of Chairman Packwood. The Senate bill, which 
in retrospect appears to have been the key to ensuring broad 
political support for reform, differed from the House proposal 
in at least five important ways. The Senate plan included only 
two tax rate classes for personal taxes, 15 and 27 percent. The 
very low top rate made the package particularly attractive, but 
required more base broadening to maintain revenue. There 
fore, the Senate plan phased out the personal exemption for 
families with incomes above $145,000, eliminated the deduc 
tion for consumer interest (except on mortgages), ended the 
deduction for state and local sales taxes, and continued 
deductions for individual retirement accounts only for taxpay 
ers not covered by pension plans. Similarly, the Senate plan 
proposed lower corporate rates, but a broader base, than in 
the House bill.
After lengthy and uncertain conference committee sessions 
during the summer, agreement was reached on a compromise 
plan in August. A fundamental federal income tax reform bill 
was approved by the Congress in September. That version 
maintains two formal personal tax rate classes (15 and 28 
percent), phaseout of the personal exemption (which effec 
tively imposes a higher marginal tax rate on high income 
taxpayers), elimination of the deductions for consumer inter 
est and state and local sales taxes, curtailment of the deduc 
tion for IRA accounts and includes taxation of capital gains
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as ordinary income. Also, losses from most tax shelters, 
so-called "passive" investments, may not be used to offset 
income from other sources. On the corporate side, the top rate 
is 34 percent with the investment tax credit repealed and many 
deductions reduced or eliminated. Minimum taxes were added 
for both individuals and corporations.
This proposal which emerged from the conference commit 
tee was signed into law by President Reagan on October 22, 
1986. The net effect is expected to be a substantial reduction in 
personal tax collections (perhaps about 6 percent) and a 
substantial increase in corporate tax collections.
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NOTE
1. This is far from a perfect procedure. In effect, it assumes that a taxpayer 
with a given income can expect the same percentage reduction in personal 
taxes regardless of state of residence.
